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EARL M. MALTZ*
From amid the confusion surrounding the United States Supreme
Court's equal protection analysis,' Justice Powell's vote has emerged as the
single most accurate barometer of the Burger Court's attitude in this area
of the law. While the Warren Court had concentrated on determining
which rights were to be deemed fundamental in equal protection cases, 2 the
Burger Court seems preoccupied with what might be called the "pure
classification problem": the question of which groups deserve special
judicial protection In the pure classification areas of greatest
controversy-so-called "reverse" racial discrimination and discrimination
based on alienage, sex and illegitimacy-through the 1978-79 term Justice
Powell had participated in twenty-one decisions in which a divided Court
adjudicated constitutional claims.4 In twenty of these cases, including
* B.A., Northwestern Univ.; J.D., Harvard Univ.; Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. For the purposes of this article, the term "equal protection analysis" includes not only cases
decided under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but also those decided under
the equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In general, the same standards of review apply under both clauses. See,
e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975).
See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541
(1977). But compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (rejecting challenge to restrictions of
Social Security benefits to aliens who had been in the country for at least five years) with Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down similar restrictions on welfare benefits provided by
states).
2. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate movement). See also Gunther, Foreword: In Seard
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mfodelfor a NeVewer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1, 8-9 & nn. 33-40 (1972).
3. The fundamental rights problem has not been entirely absent from Burger Court equal
protection jurisprudence. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry);
MemorialHosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to travel). However, the current Court
seems more inclined to deal with such issues under the due process clause. See, e.g., Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. The twenty-one cases are Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979) (sex); Parham v.
Hughes, 99 S. CL 1742 (1979) (sex); Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979) (alienage); Lalliv. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978) (illegitimacy); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (alienage); Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (alienage); Fiallo v. Bell,430 U.S. 787 (1977) (illegitimacyand sex);Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (sex); United
Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) ("reverse" racial discrimination); Craig ,.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex); Mathews v. Lucas,427 U.S.495 (1976) (illegitimacy); Examing Bd. of
Eng'rs, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Ortero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (alienage); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (sex); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (sex); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 711 (1973) (alienage); Sugarmanv. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973) (aienage); Frontiero v. Richardson,411 I.S. 677(1973) (sex);NewJersey Welfare
Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (illegitimacy); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co.,406
U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy). See also Califano v. Boles, 99 S. Ct. 2767 (1979) (restriction of "mother's
benefits" to spouses); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (procedural due process
analysis of discrimination against aliens); Geduldig v. Aieilo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of
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seven of the eight decided by a five-to-four vote, " Justice Powell has
concurred in the Court's decision on the merits of the equal protection
claim.
6
This article examines Justice Powell's approach to pure classification
cases. Part I will explore the various standards he has applied in reviewing
equal protection claims. It will be shown that Justice Powell's version of
the traditional two-tier approach contemplates some meaningful review
under the lower-tier, rational basis test, and that his upper-tier, strict
scrutiny of schemes based on suspect classifications is not always "fatal in
fact.",7 It will further be shown that while Justice Powell purports to have
adopted a single standard in dealing with cases in the rapidly developing
middle tier8 he actually applies three standards of scrutiny which differ in
intensity in those cases. Part II will assess the clarity of Justice Powell's
positions and the appropriateness of their results.
I. THE POWELL APPROACH
A. Two-Tier Analysis
The basis for Justice Powell's approach to most equal protection
pregnancy from disability benefits program). The list does not include cases in which dissenting
opinions dealt only with procedural matters rather than the merits of the constitutional claim
presented. See, e.g., Orrv. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102(1979); Gomez v. Perez,409 U.S. 535 (1973). Nor does it
encompass cases in which the only division on the Court is over the appropriate remedy. See Califano
v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979). Ironically, the list also does not properly include the case that is
perceived by the lay public as the clearest example of Justice Powell's position as a "swing man" on
constitutional issues-Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256 (1978). In Bakke, the
medical school of the University of California at Davis maintained a special admissions program for
which whites were not eligible. This exclusion of whites was challenged under both federal statutory
law and the Constitution. Although the Court held by a 5-4 vote that a total exclusion of whites from
such a program was illegal, five members of the Court also concluded that race could permissibly be
considered as a factor in the admissions process.
Only Justice Powell agreed with both majorities. Compare 438 U.S. at 268-320 (opinion of Powell,
J.) with id. at 408-21 (opinion of Stevens, J.). However, there was no constitutional point in the case on
which there was both a division of the Court and a majority disposition. On the question of the
constitutionality of the total exclusion, there was a clear division. Compare 438 U.S. at 319-20 (opinion
of Powell, J.) with id at 355-79 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.), But on this
point no majority of the Court subscribed to either position; four members of the Court avoided the
constitutional issue by resting their opinion solely on a statutory ground. See 438 U.S. at 412-21
(opinion of Stevens, J.). Thus, the Court cannot be said to have reached a conclusion on this issue.
A clear majority of the Court did indicate that the Constitution permitted some consideration of
race in the admissions process. See 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 326 n.1 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). But on the merits of this point, there was no dissent;
four members of the Court simply did not reach this issue. See 438 U.S. at 408-11 (opinion of Stevens,
J.).
5. The eight five-to-four decisions are Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Parham v.
Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979); Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1978).
6. The one exception is Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 126-31 infra.
7. Cf. Gunther, supra note 2, at 8.
8. For purposes of this discussion a "middle-tier" case is one in which the court adopts a standard
of review that is more searching than the rational basis test, but less exacting than strict scrutiny. See
notes 58-120 and accompanying text infra.
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problems remains the two-tier system developed by the Warren Court.9
Indeed, early in his career he was the author of the majority opinion in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,0 the case that was
probably the high water mark of two-tier analysis. In Rodriguez, plain-
tiffs sued as representatives of the class of minority school children who
allegedly were the victims of discrimination on the basis of wealth. It was
alleged that because the Texas system of financing public schools relied in
part on local property taxes, children living in poorer school districts were
disadvantaged in violation of the eqiual protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Justice Powell defined the task of the Court as follows:
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education
operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,
thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. . . .If not, the Texas scheme must
still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate
articulated state purpose .... 2
In applying this formula, Justice Powell determined that the system did
not discriminate against a class of individuals that was both definable and
suspect. The Court, Powell noted, had never held that wealth discrimina-
tion alone, like classifications by race,1 2 national origin,' 3 and alienage,
14
was a sufficient basis for invoking strict scrutiny." Justice Powell further
determined that unlike rights to vote,' 6 to travel interstate,17 and to
procreate and use contraceptives under the umbrella of privacy,'8 the right
to education is not explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,
and therefore not "fundamental."' 9 Thus, the Court declined to employ the
strict scrutiny standard 20 and used the less rigorous rational basis test.
Finding a rational basis for the Texas plan, Justice Powell found the
financing program constitutionally unobjectionable.
Even when he purports to apply two-tier analysis, however, Justice
9. For general discussions of the two-tier system, see, e.g., Gunther, supra note 2, at 8-10;
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW: EQUAL PROTECTION, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-113 (1969).
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11. Id. at 17.
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
13. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334
U.S. 410 (1948).
14. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
15. 411 U.S. at 29.
16. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U S. 663
(1966).
17. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
18. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(contraception).
19. 411 U.S. at 35.
20. Id. at 40.
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Powell deviates at least slightly from the Warren Court formulation of that
approach. The remainder of this subpart explores his approach to each
level of the test.
1. The Lower Tier
The classic statement of the rational basis test is that of Chief Justice
Warren in McGowan v. Maryland.21 "A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 22
As any number of commentators have noted, application of the McGowan
approach is tantamount to no review at all.23 Yet Justice Powell plainly
contemplates some meaningful review even when lower-tier analysis is
employed, as is demonstrated by his position in New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer.24 Beazer was a challenge to the policy of the New
York City Transit Authority toward methadone use. The only con-
stitutional issue with which the majority dealt in the case was whether the
Transit Authority's refusal to hire current methadone users violated the
equal protection clause;25 Justice Powell concurred in the opinion holding
that it did not.26 In a separate opinion, however, he concluded, with little
discussion, that an absolute bar to employment of those who have
successfully completed a methadone maintenance program would not pass
the rational basis test and thus would violate the equal protection clause.
Justice Powell's hypothetical holding clearly would require the use of
some level of scrutiny higher than the classical rational basis test. As the
district court found in Beazer, persons who successfully complete
methadone maintenance programs are more likely to revert to heroin use
than is the general population, 28 and all parties accepted the proposition
that heroin usage is relevant to the performance of the duties of employees
of the Transit Authority. Thus, the exclusion plainly had some
relationship to the goal of improving employee efficiency. Justice Powell
nonetheless would have found the classification unconstitutional using
lower-tier analysis. Apparently, he reasoned that the incidence of revetsion
to heroin use was sufficiently small that a truly rational system would rely
on individualized determinations rather than on a blanket exclusion. But
under the rational basis test envisioned in McGowan,29 the possible
21. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
22. Id. at 426.
23. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 2, at 8; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 368-72 (1949); Developments, supra note 9, at 1087.
24. 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979). See also Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,651-57 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring in the result); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
25. 99 S. Ct. at 1359 n.3.
26. 99 S. Ct. at 1370 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. Id. at 1370-71 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1051 (S.DN.Y. 1975), affd,
558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), revd, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979) (by implication).
29. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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existence of a more rational system to serve the state's interest is irrelevant.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia30 provides a prime example
of the application of this principle. In Murgia, a regulation that set age fifty
as the mandatory retirement age for policemen was challenged under the
equal protection clause. It was argued that if ensuring the physical fitness
of police officers was the governmental goal, the purpose would more
appropriately be served by individualized determinations of physical well-
being. The Court rejected this contention, noting.
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more precisely through
individualized testing after age 50 is not to say that the objective of assuring
physical fitness is not rationally furthered by a maximum age limitation. It is
only to say that with regard to the interest of all concerned, the State has not
chosen the best means to accomplish this purpose. But where rationality is the
test, a State "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect."3
Just as the classification in Murgia was not rendered irrational because
there existed a "better" way for the state to achieve its goals, so the total
exclusion of former methadone users is not totally irrational solely because
a more efficient means of serving the state's interest might have been
devised. Thus, in Beazer, Justice Powell must be viewed as having required
a level of justification at least marginally more substantial than that
typically required by lower-tier analysis.
On the other hand, the intensity of the scrutiny that Justice Powell
applies in lower-tier cases should not be overstated. He has never dissented
from a majority opinion that applied the rational basis test in rejecting an
equal protection challenge,32 and while he joined some of the majorities
that struck down classifications under the rational basis test in the early
seventies,33 such majorities have been nonexistent in recent terms of the
Court. It follows that, while Justice Powell clearly advocates some
meaningful scrutiny of lower tier classifications, his voting record indicates
a belief that the appropriate level of that scrutiny is very low.
2. The Upper Tier
Justice Powell's inclination to raise the level of rational basis scrutiny
is apparently matched by a determination to soften the rigors of upper-tier
"strict" scrutiny. His opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke 4 provides a striking example. Bakke considered a claim that
preferential treatment for nonwhites in determining admission to state
medical school violated the equal protection clause. Alone among those
30. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
31. Id. at 316, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970) (footnote omitted).
32. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)
(per curiam).
33. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); James v. Strange,
407 U.S. 128 (1972).
34. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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who addressed the issue,15 Justice Powell concluded that since the state
treated applicants differently according to their race, the same strict
scrutiny that applied to discrimination against Blacks should also apply to
discrimination against whites.3 6 In order for any such classification to
stand under the two-tier system, it must be found to be necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest. 37 Justice Powell found the promotion
of diversity in academic communities to be such an interest38 and
concluded that some consideration of race in the admissions process was
constitutionally unobjectionable.39
Justice Powell's conclusion that state action could survive upper-tier
scrutiny, while not unprecedented in fundamental right cases,40 is all but
unique in pure classification jurisprudence under the two-tier system.4 ' For
Justice Powell, however, the conclusion represented the injection of a
necessary flexibility into the traditionally rigid two-tier system. Unlike the
other Justices who addressed the constitutional issue in Bakke, Justice
Powell could find no principled distinction between classifications on the
basis of race that worked to the disadvantage of whites and those that
worked to the disadvantage of minority races.42 It thus became necessary
for him to apply strict scrutiny. If, however, such scrutiny had been
construed to be "fatal in fact," as it has been described by one
commentator, 3 legislatures would have been effectively hamstrung in their
efforts to ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination on minority
groups. By taking the approach he did, Justice Powell was able to avoid
reliance on a distinction that he viewed as untenable while at the same time
preserving at least some measure of legislative flexibility in dealing with the
problems of disadvantaged minorities.
35. Four justices resolved the case entirely on statutory grounds. See id. at 412-21 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part). The remaining four justices applied a middle-tier approach. See id. at 356-62
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part).
36. See 438 U.S. at 287-305.
37. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,375 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196(1964).
In Bakke, the exact formulation employed by Justice Powell was that "in'order tojustify the use of
a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is "necessary . . . to the
accomplishment" of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.'" 438 U.S. at 305, quoting In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). However, 'in Griffiths, Justice Powell indicated that this
conceptualization was the exact equivalent of the more normal statement that a "compelling" state
interest was required. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973).
38. 438 U.S. at 311-15.
39. Id. at 320. However, Justice Powell found the particular program challenged in Bakke to be
unconstitutional. Id.
40. See, e.g., American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Marston v. Lcwis,410 U,S,
679 (1973) (per curiam).
41. See generally Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,188-89
(1979) (Blackmun, I., concurring); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J,,
dissenting); Gunther, supra note 2, at 8. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
42. 438 U.S. at 291-99. Cf. id. at 356-62 (Powell, J.); id. at 356-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackman, JJ., concurring in part).
43. Gunther, supra note 2, at 8.
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The impact that Justice Powelrs position in Bakke will have on his
approach to suspect classifications in other contexts is unclear. One can
hardly envision him countenancing discrimination against minorities on
the basis of race or national origin on any significant scale. The only other
generally recognized suspect class is aliens." Justice Powell would give
state legislatures some flexibility in dealing with this group; however, this
flexibility is not, as it was in Bakke, provided through the manipulation of
the concept of strict scrutiny itself, but through other means. In order to
fully understand his contribution in this regard, one must first examine the
early development of the modern law of alienage in two-tier analysis.
Prior to 1979, the key case defining the parameters of the ability of
states to discriminate between citizens and aliens was Sugarman v.
Dougall.45 In Sugarman, the Court applied strict scrutiny in striking down
a New York law that excluded aliens from all state civil service positions.
However, the Court was careful to narrow its holding, noting:
[We do not] hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class
of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office. Just as "the
Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as
provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elec-
tions," . . . "[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its
officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen." . . . Such power
inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already noted above, "to
preserve the basic conception of a political community." . . . And this
power and the responsibility of the State applies, not only to the
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for
officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of
broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative
government ....
[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters
resting firmly within the State's constitutional perogative. . . This is no
more than a recognition of a State's historical power to exclude aliens from
participation in its democratic political institutions, . . .and a recognition
of a State's constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation
of its own government, as well as the Tualifications of an appropriately
designated class of public office holders.
Even Sugarman itself created a situation unique in two-tier analysis.
Under the Rodriguez approach, any discrimination against a suspect class
• 47
would be subject to strict scrutiny. By contrast, Sugarman suggested that
44. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
It should be emphasized that discrimination against aliens is "suspect" only when essayed by the
states; such discrimination by the federal government is subject to different standards of review. See
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-01 (1976). Compare Graham v. Richardson with
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). See generally Maltz, 7ute Burger Court and Allenage
Classifications, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 671, 680-85 (1978); Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. Cr. RE%,. 275.
45. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
46. Id. at 647-48 (citations and footnotes omitted).
47. See text accompanying notes 10-20 supra.
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if the question were whether an alien was to perform a function that "go[es]
to the heart of representative government," discrimination against the
alien could be justified by reference to a less demanding standard.
The difference between the Rodriguez and Sugarman approaches can
perhaps best be illustrated diagrammatically. Under Rodriguez the
analysis would be as follows:
classification
must
alienage strict be
is __ scrutiny _. necessary
suspect is to serve
classification appropriate compelling
state
interest
By contrast, the approach actually employed by the Sugarman Court
follows this course:
classification
Strict must be
if not to perform -,----"scrutiny -. __ necessary to
function at heart of appropriate serve
representative govern- compelling state
ment. interest
Alienage is
a suspect
classification
if to perform
function at
heart of repre- classification
sentative govern- Lower tier need only
ment. analysis - - be
appropriate rationally related
to permissible goal
But the departures from the two-tier structure suggested by Sugarman
were dictated by very basic concepts of federalism. Few would argue that
strict scrutiny is applicable to discrimination against any but lawfully
resident aliens-that is, aliens that the federal government has determined
should be allowed to live in this country.48 From the point of view of the
48. Cf. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (state law restricting employment of illegal aliens
not preempted).
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states, if strict scrutiny is applied, the decision of the federal government to
admit an alien in effect becomes an order to treat the alien the same as a
citizen. But the basic principles of federalism underlying the Constitution
limit the power of the federal government to affect certain aspects of state
governmental operations, particularly those lying at the core of the
sovereign status of the states.49 There is no function more basic to this
status than the designation of those who are to make the policy decisions
on governmental issues. Thus, even given the general proposition that
aliens should be a suspect class, a strong argument can be made that states
should be permitted to constitutionally exclude aliens from policymaking
positions.5
Initially, Justice Powell seemed to indicate that he fully accepted the
Sugarman approach. He concurred in the majority opinion in Sugarman
itself, and in In re Griffiths5l wrote a majority opinion in which strict
scrutiny was applied to strike down a state ban on the admission of aliens
to the bar. However, his approach in Ambach v. Norwick 52 represented a
substantial departure from Sugarman.53 Ambach was a challenge to a New
York statute that precluded any lawfully resident alien from becoming a
schoolteacher unless he had manifested an intention to apply for
citizenship. Conceding that alienage is a suspect classification, 4 Justice
Powell concluded that, because teachers performed important
governmental functions, the rational basis test was the appropriate
standard of review.55 Applying this test, Justice Powell had no trouble
rejecting the constitutional challenge.
In support of his conclusion, Justice Powell did cite the language from
Sugarman which indicated that alienage classifications that preserve "the
basic conception of a political community" will not be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny.56 But it is difficult if not impossible to characterize the
Ambach classification as fitting within that mold or to justify the result in
the case by reference to the principles of federalism which underlay the
Sugarman concept. Education is no doubt one of the most important
functions of the state, but teachers are in no sense policymakers; they
49. See Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (prior to enactment of constitutional
amendment, Congress had no power to order states to lower voting age). See generally National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U .S. 833 (1976).
50. See Maltz, supra note 44, at 690. Cf. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the
Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1092 (1977).
51. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
52. 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979).
53. It has been argued that the erosion of the Sugarman principles actually began with the
Court's decision in Foleyv. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), in which the Court refused to strikedowna
state ban on the employment of aliens as police officers. See id. at 307-12 (Stevens,J., dissenting);Id. at
302-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, in Foley, the analysis employed by the majority tracked
the Sugarman approach very closely. See id. at 297-300 (majority opinion).
54. 99 S. Ct. at 1593, citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
55. 99 S. Ct. at 1594-96.
56. Id. at 1593, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
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simply carry out educational policies much as public employees generally
carry out other policies devised by governmental leaders. To define the
teaching function as being at the core of the sovereign prerogative of the
state would be to extend that concept far beyond the bounds envisioned in
Sugarman. Thus, if the decision in Ambach is to be adequately explained,
it must rest on other factors.
For Justice Powell, one critical factor may well have been his aversion
to "federalization" of the educational process. The theme of local control
of school systems is one that runs through many of Justice Powell's
opinions, not only in equal protection cases but in other areas as well. 57 His
resistance to what he views as the trend toward the Court becoming a
national school board no doubt strongly influenced his approach to the
Ambach case.
B. The Middle Tier
Perhaps the most dramatic development in Burger Court equal
protection jurisprudence has been the formal emergence, if not general
acceptance, of a standard of review more demanding than the rational
basis test but less stringent than strict scrutiny.53 This "middle-tier"
analysis has been explicitly recognized in cases dealing with discrimination
on the bases of sex and legitimacy of birth.59 Justice Powell has been an
active participant in the evolution of the standard governing such cases. 60
His first opinion in a case concerning sex-based discrimination came in
Frontiero v. Richardson.61 Frontiero was a challenge to a federal statute
which provided that wives of servicemen would automatically be treated as
dependents for purposes of the men receiving certain special benefits;
husbands of servicewomen, by contrast, would only be considered
dependents if it were shown that the wife provided over one-half of the
support for her spouse. Four members of the Court voted to overturn the
classification on the ground sex should be considered a suspect
classification and that strict scrutiny should therefore be applied.6 2 Justice
57. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,682 (11977) (Powell, J.); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 600 n.22 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Among the more notable descriptions of the rise of middle-tier analysis are Gunther, supra
note 2, and Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee:
Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974).
59. Justice Powell has also applied middle-tier analysis to an equal protection case that a
majority of the court analyzed as involving a fundamental right which triggered strict scrutiny.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,396-403 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) (right to marry).
60. Of course, Justice Powell is not alone on the Court in his recognition of the existence of a
middle level of review. Only Justice Rehnquist continues to resist the concept entirely. See, e.g.,
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U,S.
190, 217-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even he, however, has recently joined in an opinion
which applied middle-tier scrutiny in finding a sex-based classification constitutionally invalid,
Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655, 2665-66 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joining in opinion of Powell, J.,
concurring in part).
61. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
62. Id. at 682-91 (Brennan, J.).
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Powell concurred in this result,63 but declined to adopt the strict scrutiny
rationale. Instead, he argued that the classification was unconstitutional
under the standard that a unanimous Court had applied in Reed v.
Reed 64 -that a distinction must " 'rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation .... ,,65
The Reed Court seemed to be attempting to cast its decision in terms
of traditional rational basis analysis; 66 from his reliance on Reed it might
have been inferred that Justice Powell was attempting to fit the Frontiero
result into the lower-tier as well. But any suggestion that "no conceivable
set of facts" would support either the statute challenged in Reed or the
discrinmination attacked in Frontiero is obviously untenable.67 Thus, if the
rational basis test as formulated in McGowan v. Maryland had been
applied, the Court would have upheld both laws.
Recognizing the apparent dissonance between cases such as
McGowan on the one hand and Frontiero and Reed on the other, in Craig
v. Boren68 Justice Powell formally rejected the applicability of two-tier
analysis to sex discrimination. In Boren, the Court struck down an
Oklahoma law that allowed women to buy 3.2% beer at age eighteen, but
prohibited men from buying such beer until age twenty-one. Concurring,
Justice Powell conceded that the distinction had a rational relationship to
the governmental interest in promoting traffic safety;69 he insisted,
however, that the Reed v. Reed standard compelled an invalidation of the
Oklahoma law. He conceded that "candor compels the recognition that the
relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally applied
takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification.'70
The Boren opinion is important not only for its candid recognition of a
middle-tier test, but also because it seemed to indicate that Justice Powell
would apply the same substantial relationship test to discrimination
against men as to discrimination against women. 1
63. Id. at 691-92.
64. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court struck down an Idaho statute that gave preference to
men over women when a person of the same "entitlement class" applied for appointment as
administrator of a decedent's estate.
65. 404 U.S. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920).
66. See 404 U.S. at 76 (stating question as whether discrimination has rational basis).
67. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84 (1977) (Brennan, J.).
68. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
69. Id. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring) (by implication).
70. Id. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). See also id. at 210.
71. The phrasing of this test has not been entirely consistent. Compare, e.g., Caban v.
Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1766 (1979) ("question . . .is whether the distinction . .. between
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers bears a substantial relation to some important state
interest") (emphasis added) with Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1979) (Powell, J.) (issue whether
classification "substantially related to some permissible state [interest]"). However, the potentially
critical difference between an "important" and a "permissible" state interest has thus far had no
practical significance. When the Court has struck down classifications using a middle-tier approach,
the importance of the asserted governmental interest has generally been conceded; the flow that has
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While this theoretical framework has been the basis of all his sex
discrimination opinions, Justice Powell has employed a number of
different formulations to describe his approach to the analysis of
discrimination based on illegitimacy. His first opinion dealing with such
classifications came in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 72 in which
the Court struck down a Louisiana statute denying unacknowledged
illegitimate children the right to recover under workmen's compensation
laws for the death of their natural fathers. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Powell characterized the inquiry as "a dual one: What legitimate state
interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal
rights might the classification endanger? '  He conceded that "the
regulation and protection of the family has indeed been a venerable state
concern."74 He argued, however, that "penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent. He also
noted the state concern with obviating "potentially difficult problems of
proof";76 but in Weber, he found that the elimination of the exclusion of
unacknowledged illegitimates would impose no additional burden on the
state court system, since all claimants were already required to prove
dependency.77 Thus, Justice Powell concluded that the exclusion of
unacknowledged illegitimates violated the equal protection clause.
The language of his Weber opinion suggested that Justice Powell
viewed an ad hoe balancing test as appropriate in cases concerning
discrimination against illegitimates. His majority opinion in Trimble v.
Gordon78 reinforced this impression. In Trimble, an equal protection
challenge was mounted to an Illinois statute that prevented illegitimates
from inheriting from their natural fathers who died intestate. The interests
considered by the Court were much the same as those rejected in Weber-
the promotion of legitimate family relationships79 and the need to avoid
protracted litigation over issues of paternity.80 Justice Powell conceded
been found is that the challenged classification is not sufficiently related to that interest. See, e.g.,
Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J.
concurring).
It should also be noted at this juncture that the application of the same test to all gender-based
discrimination regardless of which sex is disadvantaged by the classification does not necessarily mean
that men and women are to be dealt with equally. There is some indication that Justice Powell views
with greater tolerance discrimination in favor of women when the purpose is to ameliorate past
disadvantages suffered by that sex. See notes 109-14 and accompanying text infra.
72. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
73. Id. at 173.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 175.
76. Id. at 174.
77. Id.
78. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
79. Id. at 768-70.
80. Id. at 770-73. Justice Powell also considered the possibility that the statute was enacted in an
attempt to carry out the "presumed intentions of the citizens of the state who died [intestate]." 430 U.S.
at 774. While not passing on the q4iition of whether the discrimination in Trimbl could have been
constitutionally justified by such a purpose, see id. at 775 & n.16, he concluded that cffectuation of
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that the challenged classification served the latter interest.'1 He
nevertheless found the Illinois scheme constitutionally infirm, applying a
standard that he described as less than the Court's "most exacting
scrutiny" but "not toothless"'2-a phrase borrowed from an earlier
opinion of Justice Blackmun. 3 Under this standard, Justice Powell held
that a discrimination must be " 'carefully tuned to alternative
considerations.' ,84 He found that the Trimble statute failed the test
because the state could further its interest sufficiently by adopting a
"middle ground" between complete exclusion and case-by-case deter-
minations of paternity. 5
In Lalli v. Lalli, 86 Justice Powell assimilated his concept of a statute
"'carefully tuned to alternative considerations' " to the language of his
sex-discrimination analysis. The Court was faced with a statute that
allowed all legitimate children to inherit from their fathers who died
intestate, but gave the same right to only those illegitimate children who
presumed intentions was not in fact a goal that actuated the legislative enactment of the challenged
discrimination. See id. at 774-76.
But even if this perception is accurate, Justice Powell does not appear to have addressed all ofthe
relevant governmental interests in Trimble. His focus on the need to avoid difficulties of proof of
paternity may well have been accurate in cases such as Weber, which deal with attempts to recompense
children for the loss of their parents. Given that even before the Court's decision in Gomezv. Perez,409
U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam), illegitimate children generally had a right to financial support from their
parents, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF Do,,iEsric RELATIONS IN TIlE UNITED STATES 177 (1968), the only
conceivable justiication for denying them such recompense is either blind prejudice or an attempt to
avoid protracted litigation over paternity.
But intestate succession laws are on an entirely different footing. Such laws are not intended to
provide compensation. Rather, they address the far more basic question ofwho has the mostjust claim
to the property ofa decedent where the decedent has expressed no preference.Thestatutoryscheme in
Trimble was based upon what might be called a positivist theory, with the legislative judgment being
that those with the most just claim on the estate were those whose relationship was based on some
contract-type legal relationship such as marriage.
Such judgments are classically legislative. Yet in Trimble Justice Powell implicitly denied the
states the right to make such a choice. Instead, he viewed the Constitution as requiring that, with
respect to children, the state follow a kind of natural law theory-blood relationship equated with the
rightto inherit intestate. Only where a policy consistent with the natural law theory is being furthered-
the elimination of problems ofproof, for example-may the state deviate from such a strict natural law
concept.
Of course, it might be argued that such a conclusion is implicit in the factors that lead the Court to
closely scrutinize classifications based on legitimacy. Such an argument would have considerable force
if the distinction between legitimates and illegitimates were the only area in which the positivist theory
had manifested itself. But such a theme pervades many intestate succession schemes; for example,
spouses are generally provided for, while paramours are not, even though their respective biological
relationship with the intestate are identical. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
This is not to say that Justice Powell might not have appropriately reached the same conclusion
even if he had dealt with the basic ethical decisions involved in Thimble and Lafll. It is possible to
conclude that the dangers inherent in discrimination against illegitimates generally are sufficiently
strong that legislation manifesting such discrimination, as a result of legislators' basic concepts of
justice, ought to be deemed constitutionally infirm. But the failure to even address the argument leaves
the impression that Justice Powell does not fully appreciate all the factors involved in cases such
Trimble, and thus casts doubts on the balance that he draws.
81. 430 U.S. at 770-72 (by implication).
82. Id. at 767.
83. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506, 510 (1976).
84. 430 U.S. at 772, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
85. 430 U.S. at 771.
86. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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had obtained a legal "order of filiation" during the lifetime of the
decedent. 7 Speaking only for a plurality, Justice Powell argued that the
statute was distinguishable from that struck down in Trimble.8 Rather
than repeating the "not toothless" language of his Trimble opinion, he
characterized the issue as whether the statute was "substantially related
to . . . important state interests" 89-an echo of the middle-tier standard
that he had embraced in Frontiero and Boren. Focusing, as he did in
Trimble, on the governmental interest in promoting the speedy and
efficient settlement of estates, 90 he reasoned that the Lalli statute effected
an acceptable reconciliation of the competing interests because it provided
a means by which the illegitimate could remove the statutory burden
placed upon him.9 Thus, Justice Powell found the disparate treatment in
Lalli constitutionally unobjectionable.
Justice Powell's role as a swing vote in illegitimacy cases is well
illustrated by Trimble and Lalli; he was the only Justice to concur in the
result in both cases. Caban v. Mohammed92 and Parham v. Hughes
9 3
provide evidence that he occupies a similar position in cases dealing with
discrimination against men. Caban dealt with a New York statute that
required the consent of the mother but not the father of an illegitimate
child prior to the adoption of the child; in Parham, the Court was faced
with a Georgia statute that provided that a mother could sue for the
wrongful death of her illegitimate child, but the father of the child could
only bring such a suit if he had legitimated the child and the mother was
dead. The application of both statutes was challenged on the ground that
they discriminated against the father on the basis of sex. The New York
statute was struck down, but the challenge was rejected in Parham. Justice
Powell,. invoking the language of Craig v. Boren, was the only member of
the Court to concur in both results.94
Justice Powell's performance in the middle-tier classification cases is
not noteworthy solely because of his pivotal position on the Court. Unlike
some of his colleagues, who appear to be satisfied with ad hoc applications
of the rather nebulous "substantial relation" and "not toothless" formulas,
87. Id. at 261-62.
88. Justice Powell spoke for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Stewart, Justice
Rehnquist concurred on the ground that he believed that Trimble was wrongly decided, Id. at 276
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concurred in Lalli on the ground that Trinble was of
little precedential significance and should be dismissed as a case turning on "the overtones of its
appealing facts." 439 U.S. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. 439 U.S. at 275.
90. Id. at 268-71.
91. Id. at 273.
92. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
93. 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979).
94. In Caban, Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. 99 S. Ct. at 1763-69. In Parham, there
was no majority opinion; however, Justice Powell did write an opinion explaining his reasons for
concurring in the judgment. 99 S. Ct. at 1749-50 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Powell appears to have developed relatively concrete principles to
guide his thinking in these cases. From his verbalization ofhisviews of the
appropriate tests to be applied in these cases, one would expect Justice
Powell to apply the same standards to all cases relating to discrimination
on the bases of sex or legitimacy. However, as the forthcoming discussion
will demonstrate, a close examination of his opinions and voting records
reveals at least three different sets of principles that Justice Powell applies,
depending upon the specific nature of the discrimination being challenged.
1. Discrimination Against Illegitimates and
Noncompensatory Discrimination Against Males
For Justice Powell, the key factor in determining whether discrimina-
tion against illegitimates is constitutionally permissible is whether the
illegitimate is given the opportunity to prove that he is eligible for the right
or benefit to which the discrimination relates. For example, both Weber
and Trimble were cases in which the illegitimate himself was powerless to
remove the disability placed upon him; while neither case involved an
"insurmountable barrier" created by state law, in both cases the statutory
impediments could only be removed by the parent of the illegitimate.95
Thus, Justice Powell voted in both cases to invalidate the challenged law.
By contrast, in Lalli, the relevant statutes provided the illegitimate himself
with the power to prove that he was entitled to the same benefits as a
legitimate child; therefore, Justice Powell voted to reject the constitutional
96attacks. Similarly, in Mathews v. Lucas, a statute established a
presumption that certain classes of illegitimates97 would not be eligible for
survivor's benefits based on the death of their respective fathers; however,
the benefits were provided to all illegitimates who could prove dependency
on the dead parent. As in Lalli, Justice Powell voted to uphold the
challenged discrimination.
Caban and Parham demonstrate that the same factor governs Justice
Powell's attitude toward discrimination against men that is not intended to
ameliorate the effects of extrinsic discrimination against women. In
Caban, his majority opinion denounced as "another example of
'overbroad generalizations' ,,98 a New York statute that precluded a father
95. In Trim ble, the illegitimate could have inherited from its natural father if the father had left a
will. In Weber, illegitimates were generally eligible for workmen's compensation if acknowledged by
the parent in accordance with state law. This option was not available to the parent in Weberbccause of
the rather unusual factual context in which the case arose. See 406 U.S. at 176-77 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the result). The majority opinion, however, makes it fairly clear that the result would
have been no different even if the parent had been allowed to acknowledge the child.
96. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
97. Illegitimate children were automatically deemed dependent if, prior to his death, the
deceased "(a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported
marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal defect would have been valid; or (b) in
writing had acknowledged the child to be his; or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father;,
or (d) had been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his." Id. at 499.
98. Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. CL 1769 (1979), citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,211
(1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
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from effectively objecting to the adoption of his illegitimate child while
requiring the consent of the mother: "[T]his undifferentiated distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all cir-
cumstances where adoption of a child of theirs is at issue, does not bear a
substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests." 99 By contrast,
concurring in the result in Parham, he relied almost exclusively on the fact
that "[i]t lies entirely within a father's power to remove himself from the
disability that only he will suffer."100 The opinion distinguished Caban and
Trimble as cases in which "the burdened individual . . . has been
powerless to remove himself from the statutory burden-regardless of the
proof of paternity."' '
The only exception to this pattern is Justice Powell's opinion in Fiallo
v. Bell.10 2 Fiallo presented a challenge to the definition of "child" and
99. 99 S. Ct. at 1769 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
100. Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742, 1750 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. Of course, the application of the principles enunciated by Justice Powell in the cases
such as Caban and Parham depends upon his perception of whether the disadvantaged individual Is
given the legal means by which he can overcome his disability. In general, this determination will be
relatiyely clear;, but occasionally a problem will arise, as Caban itself demonstrates. In Caban, although
New York law did not generally require the consent of the natural father of an illegitimate child for the
adoption of the child, the law did require the consent "[o]f any person . . . having lawful custody of
the adoptive child." 99 S. Ct. at 1765 n.4, quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (MeKinney 1977). This
statute would seem to indicate that if the natural father of an illegitimate child gained custody of the
child, the child could not be adopted without his consent. If in fact this opportunity had been available
to the father in Caban, then he would have had it in his power at least to attempt to remove his
disability; since he did not make that attempt, under the principles enunciated by Justice Powell in
Parham, his equal protection claim would have had to be rejected. Obviously, however, in Caban
Justice Powell did not accept this line of reasoning. Noting that no New York court had ever explicitly
ruled that unwed fathers with legal custody had the power to veto adoptions and relying on In re
Mendelsohn's Adoption, 180 Misc. 147, 149, 39 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (1943), as indicating that the
provision requiring consent of those with legal custody only applied where the natural parents are
dead, he argued that "[w]e should not . . . speculate whether, if Caban had sought and obtained
legal custody of his children, his legal rights would have been different under New York Law." 99S. Ct.
at 1766 n.6.
If, as indicated by his opinion in Parham, the critical factor for Justice Powell in Caban was the
presence of an insurmountable barrier to the father gaining the right denied to him, this refusal to
"speculate" is puzzling. The question whether such a barrier exists depends upon the interpretation of
the state law. If in fact a father who obtained custody could have blocked the adoption, then one can
make a strong argument that in the absence of even an attempt to gain custody, a father could not argue
that the statutory scheme violated his rights to equal protection.
Just as the plaintiff may in fact have faced no insurmountable burden in Caban, in a factual
context different from that facing the Court in Parham, a father might be faced with an insurmountable
barrier to bringing a wrongful death action under the statute considered in that case. The Georgia law
not only required that the unwed father have legitimated the child in order to maintain the lawsuit, it
also required that there be"no mother." See Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742,1744 n. 1 (1979), quoting
GA. CODE § 105-1307. Thus, in a case in which the mother of the illegitimate child was still living, no
action that the natural father could have taken would have given him the right to bring a wrongful
death action.
But Justice Powell quite properly did not take this possibility into account in his opinion in
Parham. With narrow exceptions not relevant here, see generally, e.g., Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note, The Void-For Vagueness Doctrine In the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960), the Court does not rule on the facial validity of statutes;
rather, it only passes on the constitutionality of the application of statutes to particular fact situations.
In the fact situation presented to the Court in Parham, the only factor preventing the unwed father
from recovering under the wrongful death statute was his failure to legitimate the child; thus, it was
only the requirement of such legitimation that was appropriately measured against the requirements of
the equal protection clause.
102. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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"parent" in a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952,
which granted preferential immigration status to children and parents of
United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.10 3 "Child" was
defined as including only legitimate or legitimated natural children,
adopted children, stepchildren, or illegitimate children claiming by virtue
of their relationship to their natural mother;10 4 "parent" was defined by a
relationship to a "child."' 5 Thus the Act discriminated not only against
illegitimates but also against males, since mothers but not fathers of
illegitimates could claim the special preference. If Justice Powell had
applied the principles enunciated in Trimble and Caban, he would have
voted to strike down the discrimination in Fiallo, since at least the
illegitimates had no recourse available to them by which they could remove
the statutory disability.'0 6 Yet Justice Powelrs majority opinion rejected
the constitutional challenge.
Fiallo is explainable by its unique context. The opinion was explicitly
based upon the exceptionally narrow scope of judicial review of
congressional decisions in matters dealing with immigration and
naturalization. 0 7 The opinion explicitly noted that in such a case,
decisions to discriminate against illegitimates "need not be as 'carefully
tuned to alternative considerations'" as those that deal only with domestic
matters.'08 Thus, Fiallo should be viewed as sui generis, without
precedential significance for cases concerned only with discrimination
among citizens.
2. Compensatory Discrimination Against Males
Justice Powell appears to have adopted a somewhat different
standard in dealing with discrimination against men that he perceives as
ameliorating disadvantages generally suffered by women. Justice Powell
has not written opinions in any such cases; however, his silent
concurrences in the majority opinions in Kahn v. Shevin'09 and
Schlesinger v. Ballard' 0 are instructive. In Kahn, the Court dealt with a
constitutional challenge to Florida's property tax statute, which provided
for a $500 exemption for widows without making similar provision for
widowers. The rationale of the Court for rejecting the challenge was that
the disparate treatment was "reasonably designed to further the stati
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
103. Id. at 788.
104. Id. at 788-90 n.l, quoting 8 U.S.C. § lI01(bXl) (1970).
105. 430 U.S. at 789, citing 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(2) (1970).
106. It is unclear whether the natural fathers in iollo had the option of legitimating their
children and thus removing their own statutory disability. However, the disposition of the case clearly
did not turn on this issue.
107. 430 U.S. at 792-96. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Congress has broader
authority than states to discriminate among aliens).
108. 430 U.S. at 799 n.8, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
109. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
110. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.""' Similarly,
in Ballard the Court rejected an attack on the promotion system of the
Navy, which allowed women officers thirteen years to achieve promotion
before mandatory discharge, but made male officers subject to discharge
after only nine years without promotion. The rationale of the majority
opinion was that women had less opportunity for promotion than men,
particularly in view of their ineligibility for combat or sea duty, and,
therefore, the disparity was justified to produce "fair and equitable career
advancement programs."' 2
Both Kahn and Ballard rested on the kind of overbroad
generalizations that Justice Powell condemned in Caban. No doubt there
were a significant number of men who lost their primary means of support
upon the death of their respective spouses and yet were denied the benefit
of the Florida tax exemption; similarly, some male naval officers probably
faced advancement opportunities as limited as those available to female
officers. Moreover, administratively workable options that could have
identified the relevant men were available to the government in both cases;
in Kahn, Florida could have required widowers to prove dependency on
the deceased spouse in order to claim the tax exemption, and in Ballard,
the Navy could have granted the extended time to achieve promotion to
male officers who could demonstrate that they were denied the opportunity
to obtain combat or sea duty.
One possible explanation of Justice Powell's dissimilar treatment of
discrimination against men is that, given the evolution that has taken place
in Justice Powell's approach to equal protection analysis, he would no
longer adhere to the opinions in which he concurred in Kahn and Ballard.
Both cases were decided well before Caban and Parham, even before his
recognition in Craig v. Boren that a middle-tier analysis existed. However,
no opinion by Justice Powell or any opinion in which he has concurred
even suggests that he sees the precedential value of Kahn or Ballard as
having been diluted; indeed, such evidence as there is suggests the contrary
conclusion. In Califano v. Webster,13 the Court upheld a Social Security
Act provision allowing females a more favorable means of computing
benefits than that allowed to males. Justice Powelljoined in theper curiam
opinion, which cited both Kahn and Ballardto support the conclusion that
redressing society's longstanding disparate treatment of women is an
important governmental interest. The opinion noted that " '[w]hether
from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-
dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to women seeking any
but the lowest paid jobs.' ,114 Based on this vote, it seems likely that Justice
111. 416 U.S. at 355.
112. 419 U.S. at 508, quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
113. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) (Powell, J., concurring without comment),
114. Id at 318, quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
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Powell continues to view compensatory sex classifications more
favorably than discrimination against men generally.
3. Discrimination Against Women
The votes of Justice Powell in Frontiero and Califano v. Goldfarb'"
demonstrate a far less lenient attitude toward discrimination against
women than seen in other cases in which he has employed middle-tier
analysis. As already noted, Frontiero dealt with a statute that gave all
servicemen the right to claim their wives as dependents for purposes of
receiving additional benefits; servicewomen, on the other hand, could only
claim husbands as dependents who were in fact dependent up on their wives
for one-half of their support.' 6 An almost identical scheme governed the
availability of survivor's benefits to spouses under the Social Security Act
in Goldfarb.' 17
Analyzing both cases as involving discrimination against women,"'
Justice Powell concluded that each was unconstitutional. Yet the
legislative technique employed by Congress in devising the statutory
schemes struck down in Goldfarb and Frontiero is indistinguishable from
that which produced the discrimination found constitutionally unobjec-
tionable by Justice Powell in Mathews v. Lucas."9 In each case the
congressional intent was to provide benefits only where the relative was in
fact dependent upon the wage earner. Moreover, just as the empirical
validity of the congressional assumption regarding the probable
dependency of various classes of children in Mathews seems indisputable,
one can hardly question the accuracy of the assumption made by Congress
in Frontiero and Goldfarb-that husbands are less likely to be
economically dependent upon wives than vice versa. Nonetheless, Justice
Powell voted to uphold the discrimination against illegitimates in
Mathews, but to strike down the discrimination against women in
Frontiero and Goldfarb.
The only plausible explanation for the differing votes is that Justice
Powell in fact subjects discriminations against women to more intensive
scrutiny than those laws discriminating against men or illegitimates.
Indeed, if he finds the type of classifications at issue in Goldfarb and
Frontiero unconstitutional, it is difficult to see what discrimination against
women he would uphold. Nonetheless, there has been no indication that
Justice Powell is willing to abandon the position that he espoused in
Frontiero120 and label discrimination against women formally suspect.
115. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
116. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra.
117. See430 U.S. at201.
118. See id. at 206; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Powell, J.). Compare
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U .S. 199,242 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and id. at 218 (Stevcns,J.).
119. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
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II. A CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE POWELL'S PERFORMANCE
A. Articulation of Principles
Whenever the Court uses the equal protection clause as a vehicle to
strike down laws that do not discriminate on the basis of race, it faces the
criticism that it is merely applying the subjective preferences of a majority
of the Justices rather than adhering to sound principles of constitutional
adjudication.' 21 One's reaction to this argument depends largely on one's
view of the appropriate function of the Constitution and the institutional
role of the judiciary in defining the norms by which our society is to be
governed.122 Clearly, however, the criticism has less force when a holding
of unconstitutionality is based upon clearly defined criteria rather than a
simple ad hoc pronouncement on the facts of a particular case.2 3 The
development of that type of criteria also has the salutary effect of giving
guidance to lower courts and legislatures that are attempting to tailor their
actions to fit within the pronouncements of the Court.
24
In the context of pure classification problems, the first question must
be what characteristics a class must have in order to be entitled to special
judicial protection-that is, upper- or middle-tier scrutiny-under the
constitution. The first indication of Justice Powell's theory on this issue
came in Weber, in which he argued that the challenged discrimination
against illegitimates was "contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing" and that "no child is responsible for his birth. ... 125 This
language suggests that, for Justice Powell, the factor triggering intensive
equal protection scrutiny is a characteristic that is not the result of any
action by members of that group and which they are powerless to change.
His position in Nyquist v. Mauclet126 reinforces this impression in the
context of classification by citizenship. Mauclet dealt with a provision of a
New York statute that granted certain forms of state-provided financial aid
for higher education only to citizens and legally resident aliens who (1) had
applied for citizenship; (2) if not qualified for citizenship, had filed a
statement affirming an intent to apply for citizenship as soon as eligible; or
(3) who had been admitted to the aid program under the parole authority
of the attorney general. 127 Applying the strict scrutiny standard generally
121. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-72 (1977).
122. Compare L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 999-1000(1978) with Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx L. RV. 693 (1976).
123. See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAMY. L,
REV. 1 (1959).
124. See Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1026 (1972).
125. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
126. 432 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 3-4, quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 661(3) (MeKinney Supp. 1976).
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applied to alienage classifications, 28 the Court held the exclusion of
noneligible aliens to be unconstitutional. In dissent, Justice Powell
adopted by reference 29 the position of Justice Rehnquist that a key factor
in earlier alienage cases was that the disadvantaged group was "categorized
by a factor beyond their control."' 130 Since all of those denied benefits in
Mauclet had the power to escape the disadvantaged class, then, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned, the rational basis test should apply.' 31
The theories expressed in Mauclet and Weber fit well with Justice
Powelrs approach to discrimination against males and illegitimates1 32 If
the key factor in deciding to apply intensive scrutiny in such cases is that
sex and legitimacy are beyond the control of the disadvantaged persons, it
makes some logical sense to hold that such classifications are nonetheless
acceptable if class members are afforded an opportunity to remove the
particular disability. But clearly, lack of individual responsibility for a trait
is not the sole determining factor in Justice Powelrs decision to abandon
the rational basis test in a given case. For example, one can hardly imagine
a trait more immutable than old age, yet Justice Powell has joined silently
in applications of lower-tier analysis rejecting constitutional attacks on
discrimination against the elderly in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia133 and Vance v. Bradley.134
The problem, then, is to find a characteristic that is broad enough to
encompass discrimination based on race, alienage, and sex, yet narrow
enough to exclude discrimination based on age. The key may lie in the
Murgia opinion, joined by Justice Powell without comment. Considering
only the possibilities that strict scrutiny or the rational basis test should be
applied, the Court held the latter approach appropriate because old age
"marks a stage that each of us will reach" rather than defining a" 'discrete
and insular' group . . . in need of 'extraodinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.' , 35
While not directly applicable to middle-tier classifications, a principle
analogous to that expressed in Murgia could adequately distinguish such
classifications from those that receive only such scrutiny as lower-tier
analysis requires. Gender and illegitimacy are not only characteristics that
affected persons are powerless to escape, but also define classes that
persons born outside the relevant class will never enter. It might be
argued that the fact that a class is absolutely closed to both entry and exit is
128. 432 U.S. at 7. See generally text accompanying notes 44-57 supra.
129. 432 U.S. at 15.
130. Id. at 19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. See text accompanying notes 95-114 supra.
133. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
134. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
135. 427 U.S. at313,314, quotingUnitedStatesv. CaroleneProducts, Co.,304U.S. 144,152-53
nA (1938).
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the key to the determination that something more than lower-tier scrutiny
is appropriate.
Justice Powell has never explicitly adopted this position; in fact, his
articulation of the principles that guide his decision to abandon the
rational basis test in a given case has thus far been either incomplete or
misleading. 136 Until these principles are clearly stated, this and other
analyses will remain mere speculation.
Justice Powell faces a similar problem with respect to the various
classifications within the middle-tier. He clearly subjects discriminations
against females to more stringent scrutiny than those that disadvantage
males or illegitimates. 137 Thus, it is incumbent upon him to identify the
characteristics that entitle women to greater constitutional protection. The
difficulty is compounded by his failure to explicitly recognize that a
difference in the level of scrutiny even exists.138 In order to cure the
deficiencies in his approach, Justice Powell must prepare (or at least
concur in) an opinion that both recognizes the disparities in the level of
review applied and clearly enunciates the rationale for these disparities.1
39
B. Appropriateness
Of course, the analysis of Justice Powell's approach does not end with
the question of whether he has adequately justified the relative levels of
scrutiny applied to various classifications. One must question whether, in
absolute terms, the tests that he applies are appropriate. In this regard, the
outstanding feature of Justice Powell's equal protection jurisprudence is
his approach to discrimination against males and illegitimates with its
focus on the ability of the disadvantaged person to overcome the relevant
disability. This factor also influences the approach of other members of the
136. Justice Powell has concurred in one fairly detailed discussion of the problem. Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (Blackmun, J.). In addition to noting that illegitimacy is an
immutable characteristic, the opinion also suggested that one reason the rational basis test was
inappropriate was that legitimacy "bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in or
contribute to society." Id. at 505. But this argument also fails to adequately explain the failure to
subject discrimination against the elderly to some degree ofjudicial scrutiny more searching than the
rational basis test; old age per se is also irrelevant to ability. Of course, old age may be correlated to
certain abilities, or lack thereof; but the same maybe said of sex. See, e.g., Califano v, Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Justice Powell has also joined in
some opinions which suggest that the use of the rational basis test is inappropriate if the classification at
issue discriminates against some class of persons in need of special protection from the operation of the
political process. See New York CityTransit Authority v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355,1369-70 & n.40 (1979);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam). However, this
explanation would fail to justify the relatively intensive scrutiny which Justice Powell applies to
discrimination against men.
For other discussions of the appropriate criteria to be applied in determining whether middle-tier
analysis is appropriate, see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 358-62 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 218-19 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. See text accompanying notes 95-120 supra.
138. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
139. For an example of such an opinion, see Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217-24 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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Court to equal protection problems;140 Justice Powell, however, puts afar
greater emphasis on this issue in middle-tier cases than does any other
Justice.
If formally adopted by the Court, Justice Powell's theory would
provide some needed certainty in an area of law thus far characterized by a
bewildering variety of pronouncements. But, at the same time, it would
significantly restrict the flexibility of legislatures in attempting to reach
perfectly legitimate objectives. Consider, for example, the situation in
Mathews v. Lucas.14' To have voted to uphold the challenged discrimina-
tion in that case,' 42 Justice Powell must have accepted two propositions:
that the economic benefit achieved by limiting benefits to dependents was a
sufficiently important governmental interest to justify discriminating
against illegitimates, and that a relatively large portion of the class
discriminated against was in fact not dependent. But given these premises,
it is difficult to accept the argument that a total exclusion of the relevant
class would not be "substantially related" to the governmental interest,
since a significant number of nondependents would be eliminated by such
an exclusion. Admittedly, the total exclusion would be overinclusive with
respect to the governmental purpose; but to say that a given classification is
overinclusive in relation to a given goal is not the same as saying that it is
not substantially related to that interst.
In addition to bearing a substantial relationship to the goals accepted
as sufficient in Mathews, a total exclusion might serve other interests not
furthered by a statutory scheme such as was approved in that case. Assume
that there is a fixed amount of money available for a given benefit program
intended to aid dependent children, and that this amount must cover both
the benefits distributed and the administrative costs of operating the
program. By defining dependency in terms of easily identifiable
characteristics statistically related to actual dependency and excluding all
those not possessing those characteristics, administrative costs would be
reduced and there would be more money available for benefit payments.
Although admittedly, the benefits would be less accurately distributed
than in a system providing for individual determinations of dependency,
such a policy determination would seem to be an entirely appropriate, al-
though not inevitable, legislative judgment. Nonetheless, the Court in
Mathews would probably have rejected such an approach as unconsti-
tutional. The Mathews Court distinguished Jiminez v. Weinberger,143 an
earlier case in which a structurally similar provision of the Social
140. See Mathews v. Lucas,427 U.S.495,512 (1976) (Blackmun, J.);Jiminezv. Weinberger,417
U.S. 628 (1974) (Burger, CJ.) Cf., e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.441 (1973) (irrebutable presumptions
violates due process clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (same). See generalby Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
141. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
142. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
143. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). As in Mathews, Justice Powell concurred silently in the majority
opinion in Jiminez.
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Security Act had been invalidated, relying largely on the fact that in
Jiminez, unlike Mathews, the disadvantaged illegitimates were fore-
closed from rebutting the presumption of nondependency on their natural
father. 144
Under Justice Powell's approach, the Jiminez/Mathews dichotomy
would be extended to cover all discrimination against illegitimates, as well
as most discrimination against men. The arguments for applying such a
theory are strongest in cases, such as Weber, that deal with broad-based
discriminations against illegitimates generally; in such cases one could
plausibly argue that there is a great danger that the discrimination is the
result of mere blind prejudice, rather than a conscious legislative
consideration of the relative interests at stake. 45 By contrast, Jiminez
presents a weaker case for the application of Justice Powell's theory; the
fact that the statute differentiated among narrowly-defined subclasses of
illegitimates rather than discriminated generally against children of unwed
parents 146 belied any suggestion that the discrimination was merely the
product of an automatic reaction against illegitimates generally. In such a
situation it is at best questionable whether the gain in certainty engendered
by a bright line rule such as that advocated by Justice Powell outweighs the
disadvantages caused by the rigidity that such a rule imposes on the
legislative process.
IIl. CONCLUSION
Justice Powell has made considerable progress toward developing a
coherent approach for dealing with pure classification problems. He has
moderated both tiers of the two-tier test, and without expanding the list of
suspect classifications, he has subjected certain questionable classifications
to more rigorous scrutiny than previously called for by traditional
tandards.' It remains, however, for Justice Powell to articulate the
heretofore unknowable premises on which his opinions are based,
especially in regard to scrutiny of discrimination against women and
aliens.
144. See 427 U.S. at 511-12.
145. See generally Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. See 417 U.S. at 631 n.2.
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